A simple IDOR in India’s income‑tax portal let any logged‑in user view other taxpayers’ records by swapping PAN numbers, exposing names, addresses, bank details, and Aadhaar IDs. When a single national identifier is linked across services, one portal bug becomes a gateway to large‑scale identity theft and fraud. This turns routine web mistakes into systemic failures.
— It warns that centralized ID schemes create single points of failure and need stronger authorization design, red‑team audits, and legal accountability.
msmash
2026.01.14
85% relevant
Both pieces concern the political and security risks of large, state‑led digital identity projects: the UK reversal mirrors the concerns raised about centralized ID schemes (e.g., Aadhaar) — privacy, single‑point‑of‑failure, and political backlash — and the UK article supplies concrete evidence (3M petition, polling collapse) that public resistance can derail such programs.
BeauHD
2026.01.09
90% relevant
Both stories show how centralized, cross‑linked public program datasets become single points of catastrophic exposure: Illinois’ misconfigured mapping website exposed Medicaid/Medicare program records for 672,616 people for four years, echoing the Aadhaar point that a centralized identifier/web of services turns one technical failure into mass risk.
msmash
2025.12.01
70% relevant
Preinstalling a government app that likely integrates IMEI/device identifiers and telecom data increases centralized attack surface and single‑point‑of‑failure risk much like the Aadhaar/ID aggregation example: a bug or breach in the app or its backend could expose nationwide device/identity data.
BeauHD
2025.10.08
100% relevant
TechCrunch’s report that India’s e‑Filing portal exposed Aadhaar numbers and bank accounts via an IDOR vulnerability.