The article argues Amazon’s growing cut of seller revenue (roughly 45–51%) and MFN clauses force merchants to increase prices not just on Amazon but across all channels, including their own sites and local stores. Combined with pay‑to‑play placement and self‑preferencing, shoppers pay more even when they don’t buy on Amazon.
— It reframes platform dominance as a system‑wide consumer price inflator, strengthening antitrust and policy arguments that focus on MFNs, junk fees, and self‑preferencing.
msmash
2026.01.15
75% relevant
This article is a concrete instance of the broader idea that Amazon extracts rents and structures seller economics: Amazon invested $475M and secured a guaranteed referral fee stream (reportedly $900M over eight years), and Saks’ bankruptcy threatens that revenue stream—showing how platform fee promises and vertical partnerships transmit risk and price pressure through retail markets.
EditorDavid
2026.01.10
78% relevant
The article documents Amazon expanding into large‑format physical retail; this amplifies the company's market touchpoints (online marketplaces plus dominant physical footprint) and connects to the existing idea that Amazon’s platform economics and merchant leverage can raise prices systemwide — the proposed Orland Park superstore (229,000 sq ft) is a concrete actor/asset that could strengthen Amazon’s cross‑channel pricing and distribution power.
EditorDavid
2025.10.05
100% relevant
Doctorow’s claims that Amazon’s fees reach 45–51%, that MFN terms require price parity off‑platform, and the FTC’s antitrust suit citing these practices.