China expanded rare‑earth export controls to add more elements, refining technologies, and licensing that follows Chinese inputs and equipment into third‑country production. This extends Beijing’s reach beyond its borders much like U.S. semiconductor rules, while it also blacklisted foreign firms it deems hostile. With China processing over 90% of rare earths, compliance and supply‑risk pressures will spike for chip and defense users.
— It signals a new phase of weaponized supply chains where both superpowers project export law extraterritorially, forcing firms and allies to pick compliance regimes.
msmash
2026.01.16
55% relevant
The article illustrates Beijing’s active use of domestic regulatory tools to shape who may access strategic technological capabilities inside its borders—paralleling other great‑power moves to use law and policy as industrial tools. It shows China exercising unilateral control over infrastructure used by foreign actors (Citadel, Jane Street, Jump).
James Farquharson
2026.01.10
72% relevant
The piece notes Chinese discussion of using policy levers (gold, two‑currency schemes, digital RMB) and how states weaponize financial and trade tools — resonant with the existing idea that export and jurisdictional controls are becoming tools both ways, altering global digital and commodity governance.
BeauHD
2025.10.10
100% relevant
Commerce Ministry’s rule requiring export licenses for foreign rare‑earth products containing Chinese material/equipment and the blacklist of TechInsights and affiliates.