Platforms, markets, and news outlets gather and redistribute information, but we should not impose on them a general duty to police whether every source violated a private secrecy promise. Requiring such policing is practically infeasible (verification, surveillance, liability) and shifts enforcement burdens from principal promise‑holders to public intermediaries.
— If regulators demand that information intermediaries enforce private secrecy promises, they will reshape free‑speech norms, chill reporting and market participation, and create a technically intractable compliance regime with large political consequences.
EditorDavid
2026.04.18
85% relevant
Section 702 relies on access to communications carried by private providers; the article reports lawmakers balking at long‑term reauthorization over incidental collection of Americans’ data and notes ISPs are already threatening to cease compliance — directly tying the politics of FISA to the older idea that intermediaries should not be turned into unchecked government surveillance agents.
Robin Hanson
2026.01.09
100% relevant
Robin Hanson’s critique of using CFTC Rule 180.1 and insider‑trading claims to shut down Polymarket (Polymarket trades + crypto anonymity + media inquiries) exemplifies the tactic and its problems.
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