When a currency and economy implode and strike across all social groups, the regime’s usual tactic of dividing constituencies fails and cross‑class protest becomes possible; in such conditions even resilient authoritarian systems face an elevated risk of delegitimation. Whether a democratic transition, fragmentation, or hard repression follows depends critically on the behaviour of the regime’s coercive organs (e.g., Revolutionary Guard) and on whether outside actors provide security or leverage.
— Framing acute economic collapse as a distinct, high‑probability precipitant of nationwide regime crisis focuses policy attention on contingency planning (evacuation, humanitarian corridors, who secures order) and avoids simplistic predictions based solely on protest counts.
Yascha Mounk
2026.01.10
100% relevant
Scott Anderson repeatedly attributes the current Iranian revolt’s strength to the currency collapse/devaluation and notes that because everyone is affected (not just a single cohort), classic divide‑and‑rule strategies no longer work; he points to the Revolutionary Guard as the decisive actor determining the outcome.
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