European politicians are consistently more socially liberal than voters—and even their own party members—on crime and immigration, unlike on economic issues where views align more closely. Education explains only a small share of the gap, suggesting selection effects and elite social milieus insulated from high‑crime, low‑income areas.
— This helps explain populist backlash and policy misfires on crime and immigration by showing a systemic representation gap specific to culture.
Wolfgang Streeck
2025.10.15
65% relevant
The article’s account of schools overwhelmed by non‑German speakers and of mainstream parties missing voters’ concerns on immigration and local services aligns with the thesis that European elites sit to the cultural left of voters on crime and immigration, enabling populist backlash like AfD’s tripling in NRW.
Matt Goodwin
2025.10.13
78% relevant
Goodwin cites an Electoral Calculus/Find Out Now survey of ~2,000 people across the civil service, schools, universities, and media showing a 75–19 tilt to the Left and 68–32 anti‑Brexit stance, directly echoing evidence that elites are more liberal than voters on salient issues.
2025.10.07
80% relevant
The article echoes the claim that elites (experts, media, public‑sector leaders) have shifted toward cosmopolitan/socially liberal positions that diverge from voters’ views, and suggests this value gap—rather than uniquely bad elite performance—helps explain the populist backlash (citing Yglesias and contrasting with ‘elite failure’ narratives).
Ryan Streeter
2025.10.02
55% relevant
Hawley’s thesis that Republican voters are more moderate than portrayed echoes the broader pattern that elites and media often misread or outpace voters’ positions; here, overemphasizing fringe GOP actors skews party and media behavior away from the electorate’s median.
Tyler Cowen
2025.09.19
78% relevant
The paper’s finding that adopting tougher immigration positions would drain AfD support aligns with the thesis that European elites are more socially liberal than voters on immigration/crime; closing that policy gap reduces populist vote share.
Arnold Kling
2025.09.08
90% relevant
Kling cites Matt Yglesias summarizing Laurenz Guenther’s finding that European MPs are significantly to the left of voters on immigration and some cultural issues, directly matching the claim that elites are more socially liberal than the public on crime and immigration.
Matthew Yglesias
2025.09.04
90% relevant
Yglesias cites Laurenz Guenther’s finding that European MPs are notably to the left of the public on immigration and some cultural issues, creating a representation gap that fuels populist parties—precisely the mechanism described in this idea.
Matt Goodwin
2025.08.22
78% relevant
Goodwin ties Reform UK’s surge to anger over 'broken borders' and migrant hotels, consistent with evidence that elites are more liberal than voters on immigration; the representation gap helps explain populist backlash and a potential electoral earthquake.
John B. Judis
2025.08.20
60% relevant
Judis highlights the ascent of college‑educated women inside the Democratic Party, implying leadership and agenda‑setting by a group more socially liberal than many working‑class voters, helping explain representation gaps on cultural issues.
Lorenzo Warby
2025.08.19
100% relevant
Cites Laurenz Guenther’s quantification of opinion gaps and argues politicians live among high–executive‑function peers, missing localized disorder and power‑law crime dynamics.
Lorenzo Warby
2025.07.13
60% relevant
The Anywheres/Somewheres split and the claim that credentialed, unaccountable sectors drive politics resonate with evidence that elites hold distinct cultural preferences from voters on security and identity issues.