Using industrial-policy funds to buy direct equity in targeted firms lets the executive branch coerce management and strategy outside normal regulatory channels. This blurs the line between investor and regulator, invites cronyism, and chills private capital that fears political reprisal. Unlike procurement or offtake contracts, ad hoc state ownership creates ongoing influence over corporate control.
— If U.S. presidents can wield public equity positions to punish or steer firms, corporate governance and industrial policy become tools of personalist power with economy‑wide investment effects.
Indigo Olivier
2025.10.14
72% relevant
By urging 51% state ownership and public board seats in prime contractors, the piece underscores how public equity can steer corporate strategy outside normal regulation—echoing concerns about how state ownership reshapes corporate control and incentives.
Tyler Cowen
2025.10.10
80% relevant
By formalizing sector deals (e.g., Pfizer price cuts for tariff relief) and using an expanded DFC equity fund, the White House would gain ongoing ownership leverage over firms outside normal regulatory channels—exactly the executive coercion risk outlined in this idea.
Daniel Di Martino
2025.09.05
70% relevant
It warns that even a 'passive' 10% position gives government influence over board composition, strategy, pricing, and political activity, mirroring the concern that public equity becomes a tool to steer firms outside normal regulatory channels.
Tyler Cowen
2025.08.28
92% relevant
Cowen opposes the Trump administration’s equity stake in Intel and notes Kevin Hassett floating a sovereign wealth fund, arguing such ownership lets the executive steer companies and deter dissent—exactly the coercive leverage and chilling effects described in the idea.
Noah Smith
2025.08.27
100% relevant
The piece claims Trump used CHIPS Act funding to acquire a stake in Intel after demanding the CEO’s resignation and signaled plans for more such stakes.