The article contends that U.S. central bank 'independence' rests on political convention, not hard law. Congress created the Fed, appoints its leaders, mandates its goals, and has previously threatened policy changes—so panic over presidential influence mislabels a constitutional hierarchy as a crisis.
— It reframes the politicization debate by grounding monetary authority in legislative supremacy, forcing clearer arguments about what constraints on the Fed are desirable rather than pretending independence is sacrosanct.
Tyler Cowen
2025.10.11
55% relevant
The study’s finding that central bank independence, inflation targeting, and exchange‑rate regime don’t significantly affect inflation/growth variability supports the view that independence is a political convention, not a sacrosanct performance driver—shifting focus to overall institutional quality.
Tyler Cowen
2025.09.06
92% relevant
Cowen says the Fed was 'never that independent,' noting 2008 and 2020–21 crisis coordination with Treasury/White House, citing New Zealand’s government‑set target, and invoking Milton Friedman’s suggestion that Congress set inflation—placing independence in political convention rather than sacrosanct law.
Thomas Fazi
2025.09.04
100% relevant
Stephen Miran’s nomination amid Trump’s firing of Governor Lisa Cook, paired with Ben Bernanke’s remark that 'the Fed will do whatever Congress tells us to do' and the Humphrey‑Hawkins oversight structure.