Because the Fifth Amendment requires compensation for takings and the U.S. developed giant private firms before a strong federal state, America defaulted to state-level regulation rather than state ownership. Overlapping regulators entrenched pluralistic control that makes nationalization rare and costly.
— This reframes proposals to nationalize tech, utilities, or healthcare by showing the U.S. institutional path makes ownership shifts far harder than regulatory redesign.
Chris Bray
2025.09.19
55% relevant
California’s move to reject future federal health guidance illustrates the U.S. tendency toward state‑level control over regulation rather than centralized directives, echoing the pathway where overlapping authorities allow states to diverge from federal administrative power.
James R. Rogers
2025.09.17
50% relevant
Both argue that U.S. design defaults to non‑national solutions unless a clear case for federal action exists; the article grounds this in the Federalist’s 'collective action' logic that only problems states cannot solve alone justify national delegation.
B. Duncan Moench
2025.08.26
78% relevant
The piece argues that under the U.S. federal system, city and state actors—not Washington—had primary disaster-planning responsibility and that corrupt/inept levee boards and unclear local authority failed New Orleans; media instead blamed federal racism (Kanye West, Spike Lee), misreading federalism.
Paul Moreno
2025.08.26
70% relevant
By highlighting a layered, overlapping regulatory superstructure (OCC/Fed/FDIC analogs) that grew from constitutional silence on banking and political clashes, the piece shows the U.S. defaulted to regulation via plural authorities rather than nationalizing banks.
Tyler Cowen
2025.08.24
100% relevant
Cowen cites the takings clause, 19th‑century state regulatory traditions, and early national firms like railroads, Bell, and Western Union outpacing federal capacity.
Julius Krein
2025.08.20
70% relevant
By proposing a sovereign wealth fund that takes direct investment positions and provides de‑risking contracts (e.g., DoD’s $400m plus price floor for MP Materials), the article suggests a state-capital instrument that works within U.S. institutional constraints short of nationalization.
Steve Sailer
2025.07.16
50% relevant
Sailer contrasts U.S. institutional design—immigration centralized because once inside, people can move freely—with Europe’s fragmented authorities under Schengen, implicitly arguing for continent‑level control of the external border to fit the mobility structure.