Absent restored cultural selection, small high‑fertility groups (e.g., Amish, Haredim) will eventually demographically supplant the broader low‑fertility mainstream. The long lag masks an underlying evolutionary advantage.
— This shifts demographic policy debates toward cultural adaptability and fertility as determinants of civilizational continuity.
Robin Hanson
2025.10.10
72% relevant
Hanson warns that pursuing moral ideals regardless of adaptiveness risks 'your descendants disappearing,' echoing the demographic-selection thesis that low‑fertility mainstreams get supplanted by adaptive, high‑fertility subgroups.
Davide Piffer
2025.09.04
55% relevant
The article’s ISTAT-based finding that immigrant TFR dropped from ~2.8 (2003) by nearly one child and is converging toward native levels undercuts a generic expectation that higher-fertility incomers will demographically supplant the low-fertility mainstream, at least in Italy.
Davide Piffer
2025.08.22
80% relevant
It applies the selection logic to climate politics: if eco‑conscious cohorts self‑limit fertility, future populations will be shaped by groups less inclined toward environmental stewardship, echoing the demographic replacement mechanism.
Robin Hanson
2025.08.20
100% relevant
Hanson’s premise that the current 'world ship' is headed toward replacement by insular fertile subcultures.
Isegoria
2025.08.14
60% relevant
The article’s claim that elite under‑reproduction uncoupled wealth from fertility, changing population traits, aligns with the broader thesis that differential fertility can steer long‑run cultural and cognitive composition.
Robin Hanson
2025.08.04
80% relevant
Hanson names Amish and Haredim as subcultures likely to outlast a fragile global monoculture and 'save humanity,' aligning with the thesis that small, resistant high-fertility groups can ultimately supplant the broader mainstream.