Price‑based governance can’t bypass elite vetoes when policies touch sacred values. To work on high‑stakes issues, elites must first accept 'adaptiveness' as a moral good, not just a technocratic criterion.
— It reframes governance reform: institutional design won’t stick without value alignment among cultural elites.
Robin Hanson
2025.10.09
60% relevant
Hanson’s piece offers a practical path to win tolerance for betting markets—limit easy, quick, layperson bets and allow long‑horizon, technical, hedging/information markets—which complements the argument that value alignment is needed for market‑based governance to be politically acceptable.
Robin Hanson
2025.10.07
72% relevant
Hanson argues futarchy would force explicit goal choices and shows people favor emotionally salient goals (e.g., liberty at the national scale), reinforcing the prior claim that price‑based governance must align with widely accepted values to be politically viable.
Robin Hanson
2025.10.04
78% relevant
The article extends the prior claim that price‑based governance needs value alignment by arguing a competent futarchy, if optimized for self‑preservation and resident comfort, could entrench bad goals at global scale and block rival systems, risking 'comfortable extinction.'
Robin Hanson
2025.10.02
45% relevant
While that idea centers on value‑based vetoes, this post tackles a technical precondition for futarchy working at all—avoiding selection‑induced price bias—thus complementing the moral‑legitimacy critique with an operational one.
Robin Hanson
2025.08.25
60% relevant
Hanson identifies a domain where executive veto is weaker—outsider‑negotiated supplier choices—offering a practical adoption path that sidesteps some value‑alignment resistance by starting where leaders feel less personal ownership.
Robin Hanson
2025.08.20
100% relevant
Hanson notes business elites defer to prices until norms are implicated and recalls his Policy Analysis Market scandal as proof that moral offense overrides price signals.
Robin Hanson
2025.08.11
80% relevant
Hanson’s 'repudiation markets' is a targeted futarchy-style application: use markets to guide decisions when consent is unavailable, contingent on elites accepting 'minimize future repudiation' as a legitimate objective for governance.
Robin Hanson
2025.08.10
60% relevant
The article applies a futarchy-like approach (market prices guiding policy) to welfare eligibility; its feasibility depends on public and elite acceptance of market-guided adjudication for morally charged aid decisions.