Fukuyama argues that among familiar causes of populism—inequality, racism, elite failure, charisma—the internet best explains why populism surged now and in similar ways across different countries. He uses comparative cases (e.g., Poland without U.S.‑style racial dynamics) to show why tech’s information dynamics fit the timing and form of the wave.
— If true, platform governance and information‑environment design become central levers for stabilizing liberal democracy, outweighing purely economic fixes.
BeauHD
2026.01.16
65% relevant
The article documents a prolonged blackout timed to mass anti‑government protests — exactly the kind of information‑environment intervention that Fukuyama and others point to as central in modern protest waves; the shutdown demonstrates how cutting connectivity is used to blunt the internet’s role in coordinating and amplifying populist uprisings.
B. Duncan Moench
2026.01.13
78% relevant
The article argues social media 'pours constant, second‑by‑second fuel onto the red‑blue fire' and treats platform dynamics as an accelerant of polarization and mass reaction—directly echoing the existing idea that the internet explains the recent populist surge and shared cross‑national political dynamics.
Hans Eicholz
2026.01.12
55% relevant
Eicholz’s account of Common Sense performing in 1776 the role of an attention‑shifting media event parallels the existing idea that new communication substrates (the internet) produce contemporaneous populist tipping points; both identify media artifacts as causal accelerants that reorganize political language and coalition dynamics.
Paul Spencer
2026.01.09
70% relevant
The article alleges an online, platform‑mediated spread of astrology into political spaces; that mirrors the existing idea that internet infrastructure and social media dynamics are central drivers of sudden, cross‑national political cultural shifts — here by converting a spiritual practice into a politicized identity signal.
msmash
2026.01.08
72% relevant
The blackout directly targets the communications infrastructure protesters rely on, underscoring the article’s implicit claim that the internet is central to contemporary protest waves and thus a primary lever for states trying to blunt populist mobilization.
Richard Reeves
2026.01.08
68% relevant
The piece connects the internet’s distribution dynamics to political and cultural outcomes — Reeves argues that online figures become persuasive when in‑person counters are absent, a mechanism that dovetails with the idea that platform dynamics (not only economics) drive populist and radicalizing waves among broad demographics (here, young men).
Anton Cebalo
2026.01.08
90% relevant
The article explicitly links contemporary anti‑political waves to online, swarm‑like organization (15‑M, Occupy, Yellow Vests) and argues the internet explains the simultaneous, cross‑national spike in anti‑political sentiment—precisely the causal claim of the existing idea.
Jonny Ball
2026.01.08
78% relevant
The author explicitly notes young activists radicalised via short‑form video and online culture; this connects to the existing idea that the internet and platform dynamics are central drivers of contemporary populist and movement formation.
James McWilliams
2026.01.07
75% relevant
The author attributes part of the rise in routine meanness to changes in digital technology that eliminate small face‑to‑face exchanges; this connects to the idea that the internet reshapes information environments and social coordination, producing political and cultural effects that fuel polarization and degrade civic norms.
Philip Cunliffe
2026.01.07
78% relevant
The article explicitly credits the viral spread of a 2015 Mearsheimer talk (and similar online dynamics) for realism’s new reach beyond academic journals — the same mechanism the existing idea attributes to the internet’s outsized role in amplifying political narratives and synchronising cross‑national populist frames.
Dan Williams
2026.01.05
92% relevant
The article's core claim — that the democratization of media (many people getting a voice) explains populist dynamics more than algorithmic manipulation — directly echoes the existing idea that the internet is a primary driver of contemporary populism; the author names platform effects and the removal of elite gatekeepers as central mechanisms.
David Dennison
2026.01.05
68% relevant
The article attributes the recent nativist surge to a single online creator’s viral output rather than to new economic facts, echoing the idea that internet information dynamics (platform virality, meme transmission) are central drivers of populist and nativist politics.
2026.01.05
62% relevant
Morgoth locates the cultural fragmentation and accelerated, bite‑size moral panics in the replacement of old media by social media—an argument that aligns with Fukuyama’s claim that the internet reshaped populist dynamics by altering information environments.
2026.01.04
65% relevant
Kalnoky offers an alternative causal account for Eastern populism and distrust — lived experience under state propaganda and reliance on neighbor networks — that complements and challenges the existing claim that the internet alone explains populist surges; both are accounts of information‑environment change producing political realignments.
2026.01.04
95% relevant
Gurri’s central claim — that the networked information environment shifted the balance of informational power away from hierarchical elites toward a distributed public that now mobilizes politics — is essentially the same pattern Fukuyama and the matched idea identify: the internet explains the timing and cross‑national similarity of populist surges (Gurri cites Trump and Brexit as outcomes of the same information dynamic).
2026.01.04
86% relevant
Williams rehearses the familiar divide between blaming elite policy failures and blaming elite cultural orientation, and explicitly links 'misinformation' and institutional distrust to populist sentiment—the same causal space the 'Internet as populism’s prime mover' idea occupies by emphasizing how information ecosystems convert institutional flaws into synchronized populist waves.
Razib Khan
2026.01.04
80% relevant
Hanania in the interview explicitly links the rise of populism and a rejection of 'cognitive elitism' to social‑media dynamics; that ties directly to the existing idea that the internet best explains the timing and cross‑national similarity of recent populist waves (actor: Hanania; claim: social media amplifies low‑IQ, nativist strains).
Arnold Kling
2026.01.04
76% relevant
Gurwinder’s note about 'context collapse' and the Magoon/Razib threads that credit social media with amplifying psychological distress map onto the existing idea that internet dynamics accelerate and synchronize political shifts (here a leftward turn among young women) across countries and cohorts.
Scott Alexander
2025.12.31
87% relevant
The article connects social‑media amplified moods, cross‑age flattening of malaise, and meaning‑making crises to political phenomena (Trump, Sanders, online media scenes), echoing the claim that the internet’s information dynamics drove recent populist waves; the comment by Kyla Scanlon that social media flattens generational patterns is the concrete link.
2025.12.30
75% relevant
Widespread distrust of elites and the establishment reported in the survey maps onto the broader narrative that contemporary populism is driven by informational and institutional breakdowns; the poll’s finding that distrust is pervasive (and concentrated in certain cohorts) supports the pattern‑recognition claim that anti‑elite sentiment remains central to political dynamics.
Arnold Kling
2025.12.30
90% relevant
Joel Kotkin’s claim that Zoomers experience politics through social‑media self‑expression and that online dynamics drive generational political shifts directly echoes the idea that the internet is the key structural cause of contemporary populism; Kotkin cites the Survey Center on American Life and generational distance from families as evidence linking platform dynamics to political outcomes.
Daniel M. Rothschild
2025.12.03
75% relevant
The article singles out the 'online new right' as channeling energy into repackaging older illiberal doctrines and bringing foreign conservative strains to the U.S.; that maps to the existing idea that the internet’s information dynamics are a primary driver of modern populist and illiberal political movements.
Helle Malmvig
2025.12.02
40% relevant
The article situates Denmark’s shift within a Europe‑wide populist wave; while it doesn’t foreground platforms, the pattern of rapid, cross‑country convergence on immigration policy mirrors the comparative timing and diffusion the existing idea attributes to information‑environment dynamics.
Aporia
2025.11.29
70% relevant
The article points to memes, doctored videos, and online intellectual echo chambers as accelerants of anti‑China sentiment, matching the existing idea that internet dynamics explain rapid, cross‑national populist swings and shared grievances.
Tanya Gold
2025.11.29
65% relevant
Sultana’s large TikTok following (second among UK politicians) and her touring rallies show platform prominence translating into political capital and rapid leader emergence, echoing the argument that online networks and attention dynamics are central drivers of populist and personality‑led politics.
Francis Fukuyama
2025.10.02
100% relevant
Fukuyama’s process‑of‑elimination claim that 'technology broadly and the internet in particular' are the most salient explanation for the period’s populism, citing Poland as a counter to race‑centric accounts.