Early nuclear designers concluded that nuclear war was both catastrophic and fairly likely, but they paid too little attention to how states and militaries would adapt (second‑strike forces, deterrence, crisis management). This creates a recurring error: treating the sheer destructiveness of a technology as a direct guide to its near‑term probability of causing civilizational collapse.
— If experts systematically overestimate the probability of catastrophe because they underweight institutional adaptation, policy and public debate about technologies (nuclear, AI, biotech) should calibrate between credible precaution and realistic resilience assumptions.
Tyler Cowen
2026.09.12
100% relevant
Tyler Cowen’s summary of Manhattan Project scientists' views (their push for international control in 1945 and the later rapid emergence of second‑strike doctrines, plus the 1945 Gallup poll showing public support for the bomb), and the Soviet atomic test in 1949 as a forecasting data point.
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