Marine reserves as sovereignty tools

That existing idea highlights how conservation design can be repurposed for geopolitical aims; this new empirical result about which coastlines are natural refugia matters to any actor that designs marine reserves—whether for conservation or as a territorial governance tool—because it identifies locations where reserve placement would be most effective or most contested.

While the article focuses on tech and energy, it advances the same logic as the existing idea that states can use non‑military instruments of control (here: infrastructure investment rather than a conservation reserve) to entrench presence and governance footprint: China’s 5G, ports and power plants function analogously to a 'reserve' that hardens influence regardless of who sits in the presidential palace.

The article hints that China is expanding the 'Great Green Wall' into other countries; like the idea that conservation can be used to assert control at sea, large‑scale landscape engineering can become an instrument of influence and presence in neighboring states and regions.

Jin Canrong and other pieces stressing neighbourhood diplomacy and using trade or local policy levers for influence mirror the prior observation that conservation and administrative footprints (e.g., reserves) can be used as low‑escalation means to cement control in contested maritime spaces.

Both pieces describe how non‑kinetic statecraft is being used to pursue geopolitical ends; the article shows Taiwan countering long‑term Chinese infiltration networks and Beijing’s ‘united front’ tactics, which complements the existing idea that states weaponize non‑military tools (e.g., conservation) to assert control and influence.

The article highlights how states use non‑military governance instruments (here: co‑opting existing Venezuelan institutions) to assert control and legitimacy; this is analogous to the idea that policy tools (like declaring reserves) can be repurposed as instruments of effective territorial control.

Both pieces show how policy statements or instruments (environmental protection in the existing idea; reparations demands in this article) are used instrumentally to advance geopolitical aims rather than purely the ostensible normative purpose; the article provides a parallel case where moral‑history claims are used selectively to press a former colonial power while simultaneously cultivating a strategic partner (China).

Both pieces show conservation policy being used as an instrument that restricts other public functions: the article reports State Parks maps and policies that constrained firefighting to protect sensitive resources, analogous to how the existing idea describes environmental rules being repurposed to achieve non‑environmental strategic effects (here, limiting suppression operations). Actor/evidence: California State Parks texts, 'preferred policy is to let the area burn,' and secret maps constraining operations.

Both pieces treat maritime/island features as instruments of statecraft rather than mere symbols: the existing idea shows how Beijing might use environmental designations to entrench control over a maritime feature; this article argues Taiwan itself (airfields, ports, undersea infrastructure) would serve as a forward platform that materially reshapes A2/AD and sovereignty. In short, the article supplies the military/geostrategic complement to the existing legal/soft‑power sovereignty tactic.

Both the existing idea and this article highlight a pattern in Chinese strategy: instead of only using force, Beijing deploys non‑kinetic instruments (environmental designations in the idea; cultural boycotts and import bans in the article) to expand control and punish perceived breaches of its red lines. The UnHerd piece documents China shuttering concerts, films and seafood trade after a Japanese leader’s comments, echoing the broader argument that infrastructure other than armies (conservation, culture, commerce) is being weaponized to change facts on the ground or to discipline regional actors.

Both stories show how conservation projects can be repurposed as governance instruments: the elephant sanctuary will require coordination among NGOs, local councils and national agencies (DGAV, ICNF), illustrating how protected or managed land can become an instrument of policy and local statecraft rather than only biodiversity action.

The article records a recurrent Chinese proposal to 'play the Ryukyu card'—supporting Okinawan anti‑base and indigenous claims—as leverage over Japan; this is the same logic as using conservation policy (e.g., declaring a marine reserve) to create 'governance footprints' and strengthen territorial claims in contested maritime spaces.

Wu Shicun advocates establishing an ecological reserve at Scarborough Shoal to assert Chinese sovereignty.