The plan hinges on an international force to secure Gaza, but the likely troop contributors aren’t there: Egypt and Jordan won’t go in, and Europeans are unlikely to police tunnels and alleyways. Without willing boots, demilitarisation and phased Israeli withdrawal become unenforceable promises. Peace terms that lack an executable security spine are performative, not practical.
— It forces peace proposals to confront who will actually enforce them, shifting debate from slogans to the hard logistics of post‑war security.
Juan David Rojas
2025.12.02
48% relevant
The article argues that pardoning a trafficker undercuts the administration’s public rationale for kinetic actions against drug networks or for pressuring regimes like Venezuela—paralleling the 'who will enforce it?' logic that makes foreign interventions or security claims hollow when major political actors publicly contradict law‑enforcement narratives.
Matthew Yglesias
2025.12.01
60% relevant
The article highlights heavy U.S. naval and Marine deployments near Venezuela without a clear plan or multilateral backing — paralleling the idea that security proposals can lack an enforceable 'spine' (who will actually do the stabilizing work) and risk performative escalation.
Jacob Mardell
2025.11.29
72% relevant
Chinese commentary here debates whether the US would be dragged into a Japan‑linked Taiwan conflict or resist; that mirrors the problem identified in the 'peacekeepers' idea — security proposals (forces, international guarantees) that lack willing contributors can be performative and unfixable in practice.
Reuel Marc Gerecht
2025.10.13
86% relevant
The article argues Trump’s 'international stabilisation force' for Gaza is a 'worthy recommendation best staffed by others' and, if deployed, would face bleeding harassment and function like a 'typical UN peacekeeping mission: basically useless.' It details why likely contributors (U.S., Gulf states, Egypt, Jordan, EU, PA) won’t patrol while Hamas remains—directly echoing the idea that there are no credible senders for such a force.
David Patrikarakos
2025.10.05
100% relevant
The article notes Egypt’s historical scars, Jordan’s domestic risks, and European reluctance—leaving the proposed 'international stabilisation force' without realistic contributors.