If embryos are persons because they have the 'potential' to become people or 'contain all the information,' then so do a sperm-egg pair or a powered-off computer set to run sentient code. The article argues that any criterion that includes embryos on potential grounds will unintentionally include these cases, making 'potential personhood' an unstable basis for rights. This pushes debates toward consciousness-based or other clear thresholds instead of vague potentiality.
— It clarifies the ethical and legal foundations for IVF and embryo selection by showing that potentiality cannot coherently ground personhood statutes or policy.
Scott Alexander
2025.08.20
100% relevant
Scott Alexander’s examples of a sperm-egg pair in the Fallopian tube and a turned-off computer programmed to run sentient-robot code when switched on.
Davide Piffer
2025.08.19
30% relevant
As lawmakers revisit IVF and embryo selection, practical constraints on selecting ancestry inform policy by separating feasible selection (disease risk, modest polygenic shifts) from speculative claims, complementing arguments to ground rules in coherent thresholds rather than vague fears.
Noah Smith
2025.08.17
70% relevant
The article defends embryo screening (Noor Siddiqui/Orchid) against 'eugenics' critiques, engaging the same IVF policy space where personhood and embryo selection are contested; it implicitly pushes readers away from potentiality-based objections by prioritizing health outcomes over preserving embryos.
Erik Hoel
2025.07.14
60% relevant
The story attacks 'same memories = same person' as incoherent, paralleling the critique that potential or fuzzy criteria for personhood lead to absurd or overbroad inclusions; it implies continuous consciousness, not memory alone, must ground identity.