Prediction Markets for Proxy Decisions

Updated: 2025.10.02 20D ago 4 sources
When choices must be made for people who can’t consent (children, unconscious patients, distant actors), run a market forecasting whether they would later repudiate the decision. Implement the option with the lowest predicted repudiation risk. This shifts proxy decision-making from intuition to price-based forecasting. — It offers a concrete mechanism to operationalize consent and accountability in medicine, family policy, and institutional governance, challenging committee-driven proxies.

Sources

Futarchy's Minor Flaw
Robin Hanson 2025.10.02 75% relevant
Hanson directly addresses how to design decision‑conditional markets so their prices retain causal meaning (e.g., allow insider trading by decision‑makers, announce timing just before the decision, or condition on randomized choices), which bears on using markets to make proxy decisions in medicine, welfare, or policy.
Futarchy For Ad Supplier Choice
Robin Hanson 2025.08.25 90% relevant
The article proposes conditional markets that forecast firm value (sales minus ad costs) for each competing ad‑agency bid and then choose the highest—directly applying the 'markets decide on behalf of a principal' template to corporate procurement.
Repudiation Markets
Robin Hanson 2025.08.11 100% relevant
Hanson proposes 'repudiation markets' to decide among options for those unable to choose now by predicting later repudiation.
Poverty Insurance Audit Juries
Robin Hanson 2025.08.10 90% relevant
Hanson’s scheme sets up a market to forecast whether a later jury would approve a welfare request and uses that price to decide aid now—directly operationalizing proxy decision-making via prediction markets.
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