Eclypsium found that Framework laptops shipped a legitimately signed UEFI shell with a 'memory modify' command that lets attackers zero out a key pointer (gSecurity2) and disable signature checks. Because the shell is trusted, this breaks Secure Boot’s chain of trust and enables persistent bootkits like BlackLotus.
— It shows how manufacturer‑approved firmware utilities can silently undermine platform security, raising policy questions about OEM QA, revocation (DBX) distribution, and supply‑chain assurance.
msmash
2026.01.07
45% relevant
While that existing idea focuses on signed binaries enabling attacks, the Logitech story complements it by showing the dual nature of code signing: certificates both protect users and create high‑impact single points of operational failure when they expire or are mismanaged.
BeauHD
2025.10.15
100% relevant
Framework’s inclusion of a signed UEFI shell exposing 'mm' that can overwrite gSecurity2, as reported by Eclypsium and BleepingComputer, impacting roughly 200,000 devices with patches and DBX updates pending.
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