When policymakers expand subsidies or use public funds to underwrite consumption (insurance, health premiums, housing vouchers) without simultaneous supply expansion, they mechanically increase demand and raise market prices. Political economies of concentrated beneficiaries (insurers, landlords, climate contractors) make removing these demand‑side levers very difficult, so affordability policy often fails for public‑choice reasons rather than technical ignorance.
— Framing affordability as a demand‑inflation problem clarifies that effective reform requires politically credible supply‑side fixes and reforms to subsidy design, not just more spending or symbolic commissions.
Arnold Kling
2026.01.09
100% relevant
Judge Glock’s critique of subsidy‑driven demand (Spanberger’s proposals), McGinnis’s call to remove regulations/subsidies, and Barro’s account of political obstacles to property‑tax reform
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