Textualism’s Preinterpretive Core

Updated: 2025.09.01 1M ago 2 sources
The article argues textualism is chiefly about identifying what counts as the binding legal text under public authority before interpretation even begins. Drawing on Aquinas, it claims judges must first anchor themselves to the enacted text and only then apply it, pushing back on readings that foreground broad 'purpose' or common-good aims. — Reframing textualism as a boundary-setting doctrine limits judicial discretion and sharpens separation-of-powers debates in statutory and constitutional cases.

Sources

Cutting the Gordian Knot of Birthright Citizenship
2025.09.01 70% relevant
The author argues courts cannot simply import the 1866 Civil Rights Act’s formula into the Constitution and must anchor interpretation in the enacted words 'subject to the jurisdiction,' highlighting thin ratification records and idiosyncratic drafting—classic preinterpretive textualism concerns.
Aquinas’s Defense of Textualism
James R. Rogers 2025.08.21 100% relevant
Aquinas, ST II-II, Q.60 a.6 ('judgment should be pronounced according to the written law') and ST I-II, Q.96 a.6, plus the article’s Dworkin-inspired 'preinterpretive' framing and responses to Breyer and Vermeule.
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