Export restrictions on AI chips can be defeated by routing through third countries that serve as logistics and resale hubs. The article cites Nvidia’s Singapore revenue jumping from $2.3B (2023) to $23.7B (2025) alongside Singaporean smuggling investigations and visible secondary markets feeding China. Effective controls must police intermediaries and resale channels, not just direct exports.
— It reframes semiconductor sanctions as a supply‑chain enforcement problem centered on transshipment nodes and secondary markets.
BeauHD
2025.10.10
50% relevant
Beijing’s rule now requires Chinese export licenses even for foreign‑made products that contain Chinese inputs or were made with Chinese equipment, mimicking the U.S. foreign‑direct product approach and extending control into third countries—exactly the terrain where transshipment hubs complicate enforcement.
Oren Cass
2025.09.14
80% relevant
The article accuses Nvidia of 'putting China first' and flouting controls—aligning with evidence that AI chips reach China via third‑country hubs (e.g., Singapore revenue spikes and secondary markets), undermining export restrictions.
David Cowan
2025.09.11
100% relevant
Nvidia’s reported Singapore revenue surge and Singapore government probes into chip smuggling used to reach China.