1989 showed regimes can crumble if they refuse to use force against mass protests. The piece argues the U.K. may face a similar moment, where the decisive variable is not capacity but willingness to impose violence. Without that will, even entrenched systems can fold quickly.
— It reframes regime stability analysis around a concrete decision threshold—state willingness to deploy force—rather than vague notions of legitimacy or capacity.
Hooman Majd
2025.09.28
55% relevant
The article implies Iran’s leadership retained the willingness and capacity to repress while opposition leadership fractured, helping explain why mass protests didn’t topple the system and why the 12‑Day War further consolidated control.
Saeid Golkar
2025.09.12
60% relevant
The article details why Iran’s security elites retain the will and capacity to repress: Khamenei’s office approves promotions above brigade level, clerical representatives monitor every unit, and economic privileges bind commanders’ fates to the regime—mechanisms that help the state pass the 'will-to-repress' threshold.
Ben Landau-Taylor
2025.09.08
55% relevant
That idea highlights how regime survival can hinge on willingness to use force; this article complements it by arguing that modern weapons and professional militaries shift the capability balance so far toward the state that mass revolt is no longer a credible check, empowering bureaucrats over elected bodies.
Isegoria
2025.08.27
83% relevant
Cummings describes No.10–Met meetings where leaders feared 'psychological spells' about enforcement breaking, echoing the idea that regime stability hinges on willingness and perceived readiness to use force, not just capacity.
Charles Haywood
2025.08.18
100% relevant
The author contrasts 1956 Hungary (Soviet intervention used force) with 1989 (Soviet restraint) and applies that logic to possible U.K. mass protests.