Jason Furman estimates that if you strip out data centers and information‑processing, H1 2025 U.S. GDP growth would have been just 0.1% annualized. Although these tech categories were only 4% of GDP, they accounted for 92% of its growth, as big tech poured tens of billions into new facilities. This highlights how dependent the economy has become on AI buildout.
— It reframes the growth narrative from consumer demand to concentrated AI investment, informing monetary policy, industrial strategy, and the risks if capex decelerates.
2026.04.04
75% relevant
Smith highlights the mid‑2000s productivity slowdown and presents recent productivity data (SF Fed chart) as a baseline, then raises the possibility that generative AI might be the required accelerator — directly engaging the existing idea that sustained growth depends on AI breakthroughs.
Tyler Cowen
2026.04.01
78% relevant
The paper provides explicit GDP growth forecasts tied to AI progress (3.5% annualized under rapid progress vs ~2.4% today), directly testing the hypothesis that AI is a key growth engine; the article cites those numbers and flags them as the best current estimates.
Peter C. Earle
2026.03.30
60% relevant
By framing 2026 fears as a possible structural inflection (either a renaissance or large‑scale displacement), the author treats AI as a central determinant of near‑term growth trajectories, connecting to the idea that macro growth expectations are now conditioned on AI outcomes.
Peter Leyden
2026.03.17
85% relevant
The article's central claim — that AI could trigger the largest productivity boom ever — directly maps to the existing proposition that contemporary growth projections hinge on AI-driven gains; both frame AI as the key marginal driver of future GDP and labor reallocation.
Noah Smith
2026.02.27
88% relevant
Noah Smith’s roundup centers on the same empirical accounting question as the existing item: how much of recent U.S. GDP growth is driven by AI versus measurement quirks or other factors. He cites Brynjolfsson’s productivity estimate and contrasts it with skeptical takes (Gimbel), directly touching the claim that stripping out AI‑related capex would leave growth near zero.
Andrew Singer | Knowable Magazine
2025.12.29
78% relevant
The article discusses AI’s large macroeconomic stakes (job displacement, reshaping sectors) and cites IMF/Nobel‑level economic attention — connecting to the existing idea that the current growth impulse is heavily AI‑driven and that stopping or mismanaging AI investment would have large GDP consequences.
PW Daily
2025.12.02
78% relevant
The California take links the state's booming income tax receipts to concentrated AI‑era wealth ("rich OpenAI employees"), echoing the existing idea that macro growth and local fiscal fortunes are heavily propped by AI capex and high‑earner concentration; the article cites the Legislative Analyst’s Office shortfall and attributes part of the revenue growth to AI payrolls.
Noah Smith
2025.10.12
90% relevant
Smith highlights Pantheon Macroeconomics, Jason Furman’s calculation, and The Economist to argue recent U.S. growth is overwhelmingly attributable to AI‑related spending, echoing the claim that ex‑AI the economy would be near stall speed.
msmash
2025.10.07
100% relevant
Furman’s 0.1% ex‑AI growth counterfactual for H1 2025 reported by Fortune/Slashdot.