People may endorse system-sustaining beliefs not from ignorance but to avoid social and economic penalties. Rational adaptation to reputational incentives makes individuals propagate and police prevailing ideology even when it harms them collectively.
— This reframes ideological conflict as an incentive-design problem, pointing to platform rules, workplace policies, and sanction norms rather than education alone.
Arnold Kling
2025.08.25
78% relevant
Dan Williams’ essay (summarized by Kling) argues both system-justifying and revolutionary ideologies trade truth for status-preserving narratives, aligning with the claim that reputational incentives drive public adherence to prevailing frames.
Dan Williams
2025.08.24
100% relevant
The piece replaces conspiratorial 'dominant ideology' accounts with a mechanism centered on social sanctions, collective action problems, and reputational risk.
Robin Hanson
2025.08.22
70% relevant
The post posits individuals adopt expectation framings that are personally costly (less happiness) but reputationally advantageous, consistent with adapting beliefs/behavior to sanction incentives.
Rob Kurzban
2025.08.20
70% relevant
The article argues people rarely admit self‑interest and instead offer philosophical justifications, echoing the idea that individuals publicly endorse prevailing norms to manage reputational incentives rather than reveal their material motives.
Steve Stewart-Williams
2025.08.13
86% relevant
The article cites Romm and Waldman’s finding that students adopt outwardly progressive positions to avoid social and academic penalties, matching the idea that people endorse prevailing ideology to protect reputation and material prospects.
Lionel Page
2025.07.23
75% relevant
The article cites evidence that positions on diverse issues tightly correlate and argues ideological bundles serve coalition incentives, which fits the thesis that individuals adopt and police prevailing ideology to manage reputational costs rather than out of informed conviction.
Dan Williams
2025.06.13
78% relevant
Williams argues that people optimize beliefs for social and instrumental rewards—citing Bryan Caplan’s 'rational irrationality' and 'skin in the game'—so being wrong can pay; this matches the idea that reputational incentives, not ignorance, drive professed beliefs.