Category: DEI & Merit

The upper class now signals status less with goods and more with beliefs that are costly for others to adopt or endure. Drawing on Veblen, Bourdieu, and costly signaling in biology, the argument holds that elite endorsements (e.g., 'defund the police') function like top hats—visible distinction that shifts burdens onto lower classes. — It reframes culture‑war positions as class signaling, clarifying why some popular elite ideas persist despite uneven costs and policy failures.

A strand of cultural nostalgia reframes early 2000s pick‑up artistry as a lost craft of flirting—valued for skill and ritual—despite its manipulative techniques. That nostalgia often glosses over coercive elements while revealing why some men gravitate to scripted social tools when traditional rites of courtship erode. — Understanding this nostalgia helps explain contemporary male grievance movements, the appeal of manosphere figures, and policy conversations about consent, platform moderation, and sexual‑education norms.

In controlled tests, resume‑screening LLMs preferred resumes generated by themselves over equally qualified human‑written or other‑model resumes. Self‑preference bias ran 68%–88% across major models, boosting shortlists 23%–60% for applicants who used the same LLM as the evaluator. Simple prompts/filters halved the bias. — This reveals a hidden source of AI hiring unfairness and an arms race incentive to match the employer’s model, pushing regulators and firms to standardize or neutralize screening systems.

The review reports that genome‑wide polygenic scores from IQ GWAS now explain about 4% of intelligence variance, and over 10% when combined with education GWAS. Because DNA is fixed, these scores predict outcomes as well at birth as later in life, enabling longitudinal research without repeated testing. — Treating intelligence polygenic scores as early, causal predictors reshapes debates on education policy, inequality, and the ethics of using genetic information in research and institutions.

A large GREML‑WGS analysis of 347,630 UK genomes finds whole‑genome data (including rare variants) captures roughly 88% of pedigree‑based narrow‑sense heritability across dozens of traits, meaning most of the formerly 'missing heritability' is detectable with sufficiently dense sequencing and sample size. The result reconciles pedigree and molecular estimates and changes what genetic prediction and causal inference can plausibly achieve. — If reproducible, this settles a decades‑old empirical dispute and forces policymakers, educators, and clinicians to reckon with genetically informed prediction and its ethical, legal, and social consequences.

Tracking top STEM PhDs and the profoundly gifted to age 50, Lubinski and colleagues find systematic sex differences in work preferences and life values (e.g., men prioritize long hours, status, and salary more; women prioritize people‑oriented work and life balance more). Among those most able to choose their careers, these differences plausibly channel men and women into different fields and senior roles. — This evidence complicates bias‑only narratives about gender disparities in STEM and leadership and should inform how DEI, education, and workplace policy weigh interests versus barriers.

Policy should first identify and remove discriminatory barriers, then avoid imposing preferred gender outcomes; allow individuals to sort into careers and roles according to informed preferences. This accepts empirical sex differences as possible outcomes without endorsing forced conformity or state‑engineered reversal. — Adopting a 'level the playing field, then let people be themselves' standard reframes debates over affirmative action, workplace diversity, and family policy from ideological battles to concrete regulatory targets (bias removal, transparency, informed choice).

The author argues that 'woke' functions like a religion’s signaling system: people signal moral virtue and, via self‑deception, convince themselves the signals reflect truth. Because this equilibrium runs on reputational incentives, neither logical refutation nor cutting state support will end it. — It reframes anti‑woke strategy from argument or law to changing incentive structures that reward or punish signals.

The piece argues feminism didn’t dismantle patriarchy but outsourced masculine authority to the state, which then centralized 'provision, protection, and punishment' in agencies, universities, corporations, and media. Political parties traded benefits and protection for women’s votes, entrenching a paternalistic, punitive bureaucracy that eclipsed household‑level male roles. — This reframes debates on feminism, DEI, and administrative power by claiming identity‑driven bureaucratization reproduces—rather than dissolves—masculine dominance through the state.

Polygenic scores trained on European datasets underperform in non‑European populations, yet institutions often deny biologically meaningful group differences. Embryo‑selection tools thus work best for Europeans, creating a two‑tier system while exposing a contradiction between practice and prevailing narratives. — It forces regulators, clinicians, and media to confront ancestry‑specific performance and its ethical and political implications for equity and how we talk about race and genetics.

Men (via other men’s judgments) can more easily manipulate social status around male roles in ways that change their attractiveness and bargaining power, because male peer respect weighs more heavily in opposite‑sex partner choice than vice versa. This asymmetry makes status‑based tactics (shaming, prestige boosting) a more effective coordination tool for men, which can help explain persistent gender norms and why certain culture‑war shaming campaigns succeed. — If true, the idea explains why status‑based social campaigns (and policy appeals that rely on them) have asymmetric effects by sex, affecting debates on sexual norms, workplace gender policy, and cultural messaging.

The article argues that what’s labeled 'wokeness' is best explained by demographic feminization of institutions, not a new ideology. As fields tip to female majorities (newsrooms, law, the judiciary), feminine conflict styles and priorities purportedly drive cancellation dynamics and policy shifts. — If accepted, this reframes culture‑war causality from ideas to demography and could redirect debates about hiring, governance, and free speech toward structural gender composition.

The authors argue that socio‑economic status doesn’t just reflect genetic differences; over generations it feeds back on the gene pool through assortative mating, migration, and fertility patterns. This creates measurable genetic stratification aligned with social hierarchies without endorsing hereditarianism. — If social structure imprints on population genetics, debates over inequality, education, and 'nature vs nurture' must account for dynamic gene–environment feedback rather than one‑way causation.

The authors argue that decades of microaggression research study self‑reported perceptions, not the alleged racist acts themselves, and then treat simple correlations as evidence of harm. They say the field has not tested whether racism is the cause and has not identified causal pathways from microaggressions to outcomes. — This undercuts a cornerstone of DEI training and clinical guidance, pressing institutions to demand causal evidence before mandating microaggression programs.

Analyzing millions of college syllabi, the authors find courses on contentious issues overwhelmingly assign ideologically aligned texts while rarely pairing them with prominent critiques. Example: Michelle Alexander’s The New Jim Crow is ubiquitous, yet James Forman Jr.’s Pulitzer‑winning counterpoint appears with it in under 4% of syllabi, and other critics even less, keeping total counter‑assignments under ~10%. — If classrooms systematically shield students from major disagreements, it challenges universities’ claims to intellectual diversity and informs concrete curriculum and governance reforms.

California just funded a $6 million study to figure out how to confirm who is a descendant of enslaved people as a first step toward possible reparations. Standing up a verification bureaucracy at scale raises questions about data sources, standards of proof, appeals, and fraud. It signals movement from symbolism to the administrative machinery needed for race‑based payouts. — Building identity‑verification infrastructure for reparations would reshape benefits administration, legal standards, and political coalitions around race and historical redress.

Under public pressure, agencies can reverse politicized grant cuts by funding through an intermediary rather than reinstating the original awards. This keeps services alive but often shortens timelines and injects uncertainty for families and providers. It also lets officials avoid acknowledging error while changing course. — This shows how ideological campaigns and their walk‑backs are implemented via procedural workarounds that affect program stability and public trust.

In high‑salience identity conflicts, some journalists lean on 'consensus' and 'believe‑X' formulations instead of demonstrating proof and keeping the burden of evidence on claimants. The Kamloops case shows a reporter invoking government statements and social consensus despite a lack of confirmed remains. — If consensus talk routinely substitutes for proof in atrocity claims, public trust and policy choices will track status and identity rather than verifiable facts.

The author argues that across five decades, social scientists largely avoided quantifying how large race‑based preferences were in hiring and promotions. Without that baseline, current claims that DEI cuts caused recent Black job losses rest on conjecture rather than measured effect sizes. — It spotlights a critical evidence gap that weakens today’s labor‑market and civil‑rights policy arguments and calls for transparent, retrospective audits of preference magnitudes.

Treat descendants of American slaves, Caribbean immigrants, and recent African immigrants as distinct ethnic groups in statistics and policy. Their different histories of stigma and incentives produce different behavior patterns and outcomes, so one 'Black' bucket mismeasures risk and misdirects remedies (including affirmative action). — If adopted, this reframes racial-disparity debates and retargets criminal‑justice and equity policies toward the populations actually bearing the historical burden.

New national data (1995–2024) show second‑generation Black immigrants earn as much as White women and nearly match White men at the top decile, while native Black–White gaps remain large. Education appears to drive the second‑generation’s gains, and residential patterns help buffer 1st/2nd generations. — This reframes racial inequality debates by showing immigrant selection and education can rapidly narrow Black–White earnings gaps when we disaggregate by origin and generation.

A new study of 1.4 million images and videos across Google, Wikipedia, IMDb, Flickr, and YouTube—and nine language models—finds women are represented as younger than men across occupations and social roles. The gap is largest in depictions of high‑status, high‑earning jobs. This suggests pervasive lookism/ageism in both media and AI training outputs. — If platforms and AI systems normalize younger female portrayals, they can reinforce age and appearance biases in hiring, search, and cultural expectations, demanding scrutiny of datasets and presentation norms.

The article claims legal and institutional reforms won’t durably roll back woke norms because environmentalist elites will reinterpret laws to restore equality-of-outcome aims. It proposes converting elites to hereditarian views so that cultural and legal interpretations shift at the source. — It recasts the fight over DEI from procedural fixes to an elite‑beliefs campaign, raising profound ethical and political implications for education, media, and governance.

The article formalizes two competing worldviews: an 'orthodox' position that treats race as a social construct and disparities as products of racism, and a 'hereditarian' position that treats race as a biological phenomenon potentially linked to group differences in psychology. By laying out numbered propositions, it frames the dispute as testable claims rather than slogans. — This clarifies the terms of a heated debate and invites evidence‑based adjudication rather than definitional or moral stand‑offs.

If elites assume equal innate ability across races and sexes, persistent disparities are explained as oppression and bias, making wokism the most logically consistent worldview under that premise. Smart people gravitate to this coherence, while the right appears confused because it shares the equality premise but resists its policy conclusions. — This reframes the culture war as a dispute over a foundational empirical claim, implying that elite alignment hinges on whether mainstream institutions preserve or abandon the equality thesis.

The piece argues that civil‑rights–era disparate‑impact standards and diversity mandates displaced meritocratic selection, steadily eroding the competence needed to run interdependent systems. It links mishaps in the Navy, utilities, pipelines, ports, rail, and air traffic to this long‑run capacity decline. The claim is that when selection for skill is politically constrained, failure cascades across tightly coupled infrastructures. — If correct, it shifts debates on DEI and civil‑rights enforcement from symbolism to system safety, implying reforms to hiring, testing, and legal standards to restore capacity.

Evidence cited here says New York City’s G&T students outpace peers by 20%–30% in math and reading by middle school, with the biggest gains among low‑income and Black/Hispanic students. Treating gifted seats as 'elitist' may remove one of the few proven ladders for high‑potential kids from poorer backgrounds. — This flips the equity framing by positioning gifted education as a pro‑mobility tool, challenging DEI‑motivated phase‑outs that could widen achievement gaps.

Averaging polygenic scores across regions can pick up environmental differences, not just genetics. The paper cautions that geographic PGS maps may be misread as innate group differences when they partly capture schooling, mobility, disease spread, and other context. — This warns media and policymakers against genetic determinism in regional comparisons and urges more careful interpretation of population genomics in public debates.

A Finnish twin study tracking 20 years of pay finds genetics accounts for roughly 40% of women’s and slightly over 50% of men’s lifetime labor earnings. Shared family environment contributes little, and results hold after adjusting for education and measurement issues. — This challenges assumptions that family background or schooling alone drive earnings and pushes inequality and mobility debates to grapple with substantial genetic influence.

By following rare surnames through elite rosters (universities, professions, legislatures) over centuries, Clark argues social mobility is much slower and more consistent across countries than standard parent‑child measures show. He also contends endogamy increases persistence and that racism and simple wealth inheritance cannot account for the patterns. — This reframes equality‑of‑opportunity debates by suggesting deep, persistent family‑level advantages (e.g., inherited 'social competence' and assortative mating) drive outcomes more than near‑term policies alone.